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THE LEGAL CULTURE OF THE FORMATIVE PERIOD
IN SHERMAN ACT JURISPRUDENCE*
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA**

The history of the formative era of antitrust jurisprudence has become
the subject of extensive scholarly inquiry. Starting with Robert Bork's
attempt to attribute specific economic motives to those who enacted the
law,' examinations of the course of events leading up to the creation of the
rule of reason enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States2 have
unearthed relationships between contemporary economic and political
theory and the drafting and enforcement of the Sherman Act.3 This article
attempts to supplement these efforts by placing the language of the major
Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Sherman Act in a context of
thought about the nature of law. It is an attempt to begin to probe the legal
culture of the period, but, of course, it is only an attempt. A full and
complete picture of American legal culture at the turn of the century is yet
to be written. The suggestions made here, however, are sufficient to allow
the drawing of some conclusions about the relationship between antitrust
jurisprudence and visions of the public good. If antitrust law is to be
thought of as public interest law, current understanding can be enhanced
by a clearer view of the past.
The first section of this article examines the familiar battle between the
literalism view,4 exemplified by Justice Peckham's opinions in United
* Presented at a conference entitled Observing the Sherman Act Centennial: The Past
and Future of Antitrust As Public Interest Law, sponsored by the faculty and Law Review
of New York Law School (Nov. 16, 1990).
** Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. See R. BoRK, Tim ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLIcy AT WAR wITH ITSELF (1978).
2. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); see also H. HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW 241-348 (1991) (discussing the relationships between economic and political theory
and the development of the Sherman Act).
4. Literalism espoused the view that
when the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, etc., the plain and
ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of contract alone
which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such
language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act
that which has been omitted by Congress.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897).
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States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,5 United States v. Joint
Traffic Associatidn,6 and Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,7 and
to some degree by Justice Harlan's plurality opinion in Northern Securities
Co. v. United States,8 and the first articulations of the rule of reason in
Justice White's dissent in Trans-Missour and his opinion for the majority
in Standard Oil. This section also examines the writings of three of the
lawyers who argued the Joint Traffic case as an introduction to the
vigorous debate over the nature of law which dominated American
jurisprudence in the late nineteenth century. The second section of this
article places these two opposing views-the literalist approach and the rule
of reason-in the context of larger debates about the nature of law. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. is given the third section as a representative of views
which were his alone. The fourth section examines William Howard Taft's
circuit court opinion in Addyston Pipe1" and certain scholarly reaction to
court decisions to illustrate yet a third branch of legal culture closely
related to the then-emerging case method of teaching law, and attempts to
link this story to the present day.
I.
Justice Peckham's opinions establishing the literalism interpretation of
the Sherman Act rest on two striking assumptions. The first is that
although "combinations of capital" may be more efficient than "the small
dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent" in a line of trade,
superiority in that regard does not justify driving the small dealers out of
business." The second is that once Congress "speaks upon a particular
subject, over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy
is what the statute enacts.., whatever may have been theretofore decided
by the courts
to have been the public policy of the country on that
12
subject."
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See id.
171 U.S. 505 (1898).
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
193 U.S. 197 (1904).
According to Justice White, "the true test whether a contract be in restraint of trade

is not whether in a measure it produces such effect, but whether under all the circumstances
it is reasonable." Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 349-50 (White, J., dissenting).
10. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
11. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 323.

12. Id at 340-41.
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Peckham's admiration for the "general law of competition"1 3 was not

unique. Similar views can be found in the congressional debates
surrounding the passage of the Sherman Act and in contemporary
economic literature. 4 For Peckham, however, competition was not a
completely impersonal force driving the economy according to ineluctable
laws. Its effects did depend upon the moral character of the people

involved in the competition.' s In Joint Traffic, Justice Peckham rejected
arguments for a "reasonable" interpretation of the ban on contracts in
restraint of trade in part because he rejected its proponents' predictions of
the dire consequences that would follow. 6 Counsel for the railroads made
much of the necessity of an agreement in their arguments before the Court.
For example, James C. Carter's argument in Joint Traffic discussed at great
length the nature of the railroad business in the United States. The core of
Carter's argument asserted that "by the deliberate policy of all our
governments, state and National, business has been, from the first,
subjected to the severest involuntary competition [leading to] ruinous
results."' 7 Peckham rejected this argument. "Whether, in the absence of
an agreement as to rates, the consequences described by counsel will in
fact follow as a result of competition is matter of very great
uncertainty."1 " It depends "upon many contingencies" and also on the
"voluntary action of the managers of the several roads." 9 Justice
Peckham was willing to assume that "good sense and integrity of purpose
would prevail" and that "the managers of each road might yet make such
reasonable charges for the business done by it" without making any
agreement or entering into any combination.2" It seems that individual
responsibility was important in Peckham's view and may have led him to
regard great corporations as similar to individual entrepreneurs. In so
13. Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 569.
14. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 5954 (1890) (statement of Rep. Morse) (bill would
destroy the contract system of selling goods); Peritz, "The Rule of Reason" in Antitrust
Law: PropertyLogic in Restraintof Competition,40 HAsTINGS L.J 285 (1989) (competition
provides positive values associated with combinations).
15. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 577.
16. Ia at 568. Justice Peckham further stated, in Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S.
578 (1898), that "the act of Congress must have a reasonable construction, or else there
would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men that could not be said to
have indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain
it." Id at 600.
17. Id. at 520 (argument of James C. Carter, counsel for the Joint Traffic Association).
18. Ia at 577.
19. Ia
20. Ia
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doing, Peckham pierced the corporate veil to make the railroad business
similar to a small-scale business.
Small-scale business itself held a high position in Peckham's view of
the economic order.21 Peckham conceded that progress would cause
economic dislocation. For example, the change from stage coaches and
canals to railroads "threw at once a large number of men out of
employment," as did the substitution of steam for manual power.22 "It is
a misfortune, but yet in such cases it seems to be the inevitable
accompaniment of change and improvement."' Peckham noted, however,
that the situation is wholly different "when such changes are effected by
combinations of capital, whose purpose in combining is to control the
production or manufacture of any particular article in the market" and
to dictate the price at which it can be sold. The effect is to drive out of
business small dealers and to put the public at the mercy of the
combination.' In fact, it appeared to Peckham that trusts or similar
of individual or
combinations were always the product of "motives 26
corporate aggrandizement as against the public interest."
The desire to protect the small business against ever larger
combinations of capital seems to have been widespread in the late
nineteenth century.2 Justice Peckham's view reveals the roots of such
a perspective. For Peckham, individual moral responsibility was at the
heart of the entire economic system and even the soulless corporation was
managed by individuals who could be expected to live up to their
responsibilities.' Such a view may have been outdated by the 1890s but
it was not without power.2 9
Another feature of Peckham's opinions was his vigorous assertion of
congressional power to remedy the ills he saw in combinations.3" Of
21. See Trans-Missouri,166 U.S. at 324 (expressing need to preserve the role of small,
independent businesses).
22. Id at 323.
23. Id,
24. Id
25. Id at 323-24.
26. Id at 322-23.
27. See Halper, Christopher G. Tiedeman, 'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism' and the
Dilemmas of Small-Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51 OHIo ST. LJ. 1349, 1357 (1990).
According to Halper, "the view that... government non-intervention in the economy was
the best guarantee of development was replaced by the demand for government intervention
to ensure that small-scale enterprises could continue to function." Id at 1358.

28. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 577.
29. Halper, supra note 27, at 1358-59.
30. See Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 340. Peckham stated that "[i]f the law prohibit
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course, no one could be a greater opponent of governmental power than
Justice Peckham. He was responsible for the classic statement of the idea
of freedom of contract in his opinion in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.3 1 When it
came to protecting the freedom of contract of individuals from the evil
effects of combinations, however, Peckham was willing to indulge
legislative authority.32

Justice Peckham may be drawing on republican ideas in formulating
this literalist approach to the Sherman Act. A member of a family of
lawyer-politicians and judges from upstate New York,33 Peckham's roots
were rural. Although his family was staunchly Democrat, they battled
Tammany Hall for control of the party in New York. 4 Perhaps an antiurban bias led Justice Peckham to oppose the large-scale organization of
economic life represented in part by the city of New York. The New
England influence on upstate New York, settled first by the Yankee
diaspora, may also show itself in his version of the commonwealth ideal.
According to Peckham, government could indeed promote the economic
development of society for the good of all, but only by protecting
individual economic activity.35 An aura of corruption hung about the

any contract or combination in restraint of trade or commerce, a contract or combination
made in violation of such law is void, whatever may have been theretofore decided by the
courts to have been the public policy of the country on that subject." Id. at 340-41.
31. 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (holding unconstitutional a state law restricting the right of
its citizens to contract outside the state for insurance). In Allgeyer, Justice Peckham said
that the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment includes the right
to be free in the enjoyment of all [one's] faculties; to be free to use them in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into
all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to
a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
Id. at 589.
32. In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Peckham,
writing for the Court, went further and held that liberty of contract was subject to the
commerce power, holding that Congress
may enact such legislation as shall declare void and prohibit the performance of
any contract between individuals or corporations where the natural and direct
effect of such a contract will be, when carried out, to directly, and not as a mere
incident to other and innocent purposes, regulate to any substantial extent
interstate commerce.
Id at 228.
33. 14 DIcTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 385 (D. Malone ed. 1934).
34. Id
35. See Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 324. "Nor is it for the substantial interests of the
country that any one commodity should be within the sole power and subject to the sole will
of one powerful combination of capital." Id
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corporation and its anonymous actions.36 The most important component
of the American polity was the virtuous individual who, in Peckham's
view, clearly deserved the protection of congressional statute.
Justice White's dissent in Trans-Missouri37 begins from a very
different perspective. From the start, White was concerned with the
application of "general principles of law" and "elementary principles of
justice" which raised the inquiry to a universal level where the battle was
between liberty and oppression." The inquiry itself was governed by
reason which dictated that certain contracts embodying reasonable restraints
were not "contracts in restraint of trade."3 9 Reason and principles led
White to conclude that the Sherman Act must be interpreted in the light of
congressional intent, which he saw as the preservation of freedom of
contract and trade.' Those rights-freedom of contract and trade-were at
the mercy of "the mere caprice of judicial authority"4 1 unless reason
permitted judges to move beyond the outmoded analysis to interpretations
consonant with progress. According to White, "[p]rogress and not reaction
was the purpose" of the Sherman Act.42 He believed that progress, the aid
of which is the true aim of public policy, would lead to the fullest possible
freedom of contract. 43
White's dissent was as freighted with cultural baggage as Peckham's
formulations of the literalist approach. The roots of White's approach,
however, may be somewhat more exotic than those of his brother Justice.
A Louisianian and a Catholic, White was familiar both with the civil law
through his practice and with the rigorous concepts of natural law through
his education in Jesuit institutions.w The readiness to turn to great general
principles may have been facilitated by both of these experiences. On the
other hand, White's language in Trans-Missouriclosely echoed that of the
counsel who argued the railroad's case before the court, language which
36. See id at 322-23. "It is true the results of trusts, or combinations of that nature,
may be different in different kinds of corporations, and yet they all have an essential
similarity, and have been induced by motives of individual or corporate aggrandizement as
against the public interest." Id

37. Id at 343 (White, L,dissenting).
38. Id at 344. White saw the majority's construction of the Act as "a departure from
the general principles of law, [which] by its terms destroys the right of individuals or
corporations to enter into very many reasonable contracts." Id
39. Id at 351.
40. See id. at 355.
41. Id.
42. Id

43. Id
44. R. HIGHSHAW, EDWARD DOUGLAS WHITE: DEFENDER OF THE CONSERVATIVE

FArH 18-21 (1981).
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illustrated45 an approach to law quite different from that held by
Peckham.
In presenting the railroad's argument in Joint Traffic, James C. Carter
argued that the private ordering embodied in the agreement among the
railroads must be upheld because it was necessary to prevent ruinous
competition and because no one else could supply a remedy. 6 The
alternative to private agreement was governmental ownership or
thoroughgoing regulation and, Carter maintained, "we have no sovereign
government possessing the requisite powers."4 7 This statement of
governmental impotence exposes the heart of the view of law underlying
the arguments like those made by Justice White to support the rule of
reason. According to this view, law was transcendent, partaking of a
permanence that mere political institutions could not alter. The writings of
three of the lawyers who argued Joint Traffic-James C. Carter,48 Edward
J. Phelps, 49 and John F. DillonS--help flesh out the portrait of a new
approach to the nature of law.
James C. Carter was a successful practitioner, although he never held
a judicial office.51 He was a graduate of Harvard Law School and active
in its affairs.5" After a slow start, he became an enormously successful
practitioner of the new style of corporate practice. 53 He was also an
unyielding opponent of codification in general and of the civil code
45. Compare Trans-Missouri,166 U.S. at 364-68 (White, J., dissenting) (citing reports
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to Congress for support of his opinion that
agreements among railroad competitors existed before and after the passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act and such agreements were considered necessary for the industry to evolve)
with id. at 330 (Peckham, J. for the majority) ("if competing railroad companies be left
subject to the way of free and unrestricted competition the results above foreshadowed
necessarily happen from the nature of the case; that competition being the rule, each
company will seek business to the extent of its power, and will underbid its rival in order

to get business .... ").
46. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 514-15 (argument of James C. Carter, counsel for the
Joint Traffic Association).

47. Id. at 526.
48. See J. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION: BEING A COURSE OF
LECTURES PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BEFORE THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

(1907).
49. See ORATIONS AND ESSAYS OF EDWARD JOHN PHELPS: DIPLOMAT AND STATESMAN

(J. McCullough ed. 1901) [hereinafter ORATIONS & ESSAYS].
50. See J. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AmERICA: BEING

A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE YALE UNIVERSITY (1970) (1st ed. 1895).
51. 14 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 33, at 536-38.
52. Id. at 536.
53. Id. at 537.
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proposed in New York in particular.' His interest in the subject began
when he was appointed to the committee of the Association of the Bar ofs
the City of New York charged with opposing the proposed civil code.
The need to refute the claims for the code so energetically made by its
author, David Dudley Field, led him "into inquiries concerning the
distinctions between written and unwritten law. " 5 From these inquiries
came several important speeches and finally, at the end of his life, the
lectures on the subject prepared for presentation at Harvard Law School,
never delivered,' but published posthumously as Law: Its Origin, Growth
and Function.8
Edward J.Phelps was a native of Vermont and a successful lawyer in
that state for most of his life. 9 He took an early interest in politics,
served in the Fillmore administration, and ended his public career as
minister to England, a post to which he was appointed by President
Cleveland in 1885. ' Phelps was one of the founders of the American Bar
Association and one of its first presidents." In 1881, he accepted the
Kent Professorship at Yale and taught there, with the exception of his
tenure in London, until his death in 1900.62 He remained in practice
durin his teaching career and was of counsel to a New York City law
John F. Dillon followed an influential career on the state and federal
benches with a successful private practice."' In 1838, he left his home in
upstate New York for Iowa.65 After receiving medical training at the state
university, he practiced briefly before turning to law, which he felt would
make fewer demands on his frail constitution.' Dillon was appointed to
54. Id
55. Id

56. J.CARTER, supra note 48, at v.
57. Id. at vii.

58. J.CARTER, supra note 48.
59. Stewart, Memoir of HonorableEdwardJ. Phelps, in ORATIONS & ESSAYS, supra
note 49, at ix-xiii.
60. Id. at xi.

61. J. ROGERS, AMERICAN BAR LEADERS: BIOGRAPHIES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1878-1927, at 15 (1932).
62. Stewart, supra note 59, at xii.
63. Id at ix.
64. C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M.
COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN
CONSTITTIONAL LAw 112 (1954).
65. Id. at 111.
66. Id
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serve on the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit by President Grant,
a position he held for ten years.' In 1879, he accepted a position at
Columbia University and moved to New York where he also became solicitor for the Union Pacific Railroad." His private practice grew, and
within three years he left Columbia.' "For many years he argued more
cases before the Supreme Court of the United States than any other
attorney, and until his death in 1914 was regarded as the leading railroad
lawyer in the country."7 1 In the 1891-1892 academic year, he held the
Storrs Professorship at Yale where he delivered the lectures published as
The Laws and Jurisprudenceof England andAmerica.7'
Dillon claimed to find worth in both the analytical and historical
schools of jurisprudence.72 He praised John Austin for separating law
from morality.73 Dillon had no use, however, for Austin's famous definition of law as the command of the sovereign.' For Dillon there was much
more to law than mere legislation.75 Dillon believed that law was derived,
especially in modern times, more from the general sense of justice and
right, as interpreted and ascertained by judges, than from custom in the
usual sense of the word.76 This "general sense of justice and right" was
based on a reading of the history of Anglo-American liberty.' For Dillon
the common law and the Constitution embodied the essence of AngloAmerican liberty, which has at its heart the protection of property. 78 The
fullest exposition of this approach to law, however, was produced by
another practitioner, James Carter.
The message of Carter's work is simple: all law is custom. 79 Courts
declare law,' they do not make it."' According to Carter, custom is
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id.

71. See J. DILLON, supra note 50.

72. Id at 3-28; see also Dillon, Bentham and His School ofJurisprudence,24 AM. L.
REv. 724 (1890) (address of John F. Dillon before the State Bar Association of Ohio,
discussing "Bentham's place in the history of our law").
73. J. DI.LON, supra note 50, at 6-7.
74. See generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (I. Berlin, S. Hampshire & R. Wollheim eds. 1965)
(John Austin's lectures on the nature of law).
75. J. DILON, supra note 50, at 9-11.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id at 22-23, 35-37, 57 n.1, 75-88.
78. Id at 8-9.
79. J. CARTER, supra note 48, at 65.
80. Id at 79.
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gradually established through sanctions.' First through informal ones
including self-help, and later, with the growth of organized government,
through societal enforcement of the decisions of acknowledged experts in
what the customs are. 3 At first, organized force is applied only "in the
case of those breaches or alleged breaches of custom which endanger the
peace of society."" Eventually, however, "[a]s civilisation advances, and
population, industry, and wealth increase, the social organisation expands
and advances," and the job of ascertaining custom is lodged in "regular
judicial tribunals... armed with the whole power of the State to directly
enforce their decisions."' The proceedings of these courts are recorded
in permanent form and are regarded "as authoritative declarations of
binding custom."' In this way court proceedings become precedents and
when litigation arises if "an apt precedent is found it is followed without
further inquiry, and the precedents themselves are by the private work of
jurists arranged in scientific form and go to make up the fabric of
substantive law.""
According to Carter, the state itself enacts legislation only in a limited
field dealing with the organization and procedure of the courts, the
mechanism of government, and the classification of crimes as "mischievous
acts which have not as yet been publicly punished." 8 This legislation is
not law because it is not designed to regulate directly the conduct of men
in their dealings with each other.8 9 It is designed to simply carry out the
business of the state which is in reality "a great corporation having many
things to do." 9' Even when the state legislates in relation to the conduct
of its citizens, it affects conduct only indirectly, the "chief object being to
create efficient instrumentalities for enforcing and aiding the fundamental
law of custom."9
For Carter, then, not only was the public law completely separate from
the private law, it was hopelessly inferior to it.' Public law "is made by
a single human person, or by a very few persons, and necessarily exhibits
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

L at
Id at
Ia at
Id.
Id.
Il
Il at
l at

85.
67.
170.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 229.
Id.
IL at 230.
L

170-71.
171.
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the imperfection and error which attaches to all such works."93 The
private law, however, "may justly be called Divine; for, being identical
with custom which is the form in which human nature necessarily develops
conduct, it can have no other author than that of human nature itself."94
Carter summed up his findings in just those terms:
The final conclusion of the inquiry, what rule or rules in point of
fact governed human conduct, was that, so far as social conduct
is concerned, custom is not simply one of the sources of law from
which selections may be made and converted into law by the
independent and arbitrary fiat of a legislature or a court, but that
law, with the narrow exception of legislation, is custom, and, like
custom, self-existing and irrepealable.95
Carter's basis for this conclusion was mainly historical; it was
premised on a "survey of human life in all ages and in all stages of social
progress."' These stages were several, and included
primitive man, the savage member of a wandering horde; man
when he first adopts a fixed place of abode; man when he first
consciously organizes a social state; man when he has first
acquired the art of writing and when he first employs that art in
the composition of laws; man as the subject of a conqueror
imposing his dominion over realms not his own; man as the
member of a conquered nation accepting submissively the rule of
strangers; man in society where there is no power to protect him
save his own right arm; man during the long period in which he
seeks by the establishment of judicial tribunals to supplant the
violence of self-help; man down to the period when judicial
tribunals and legislatures have been established and perfected; man
in the present enlightened age.'
According to Carter, the problem with theories of law which find their
essence in command was ignorance of the truth "that society, like every
other phenomenon in nature, was a condition resulting from the operation
of causes reaching back into periods infinitely remote." 98
93. Id
94. Id. at 231.
95. Id at 173 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 118-19.
97. Id at 119. Carter seemed to have no doubts that all nations and peoples have
passed or will pass through these stages. See id.
98. Id at 268. Thus, since the rules that society follows arise out of centuries of

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 35

Like Carter, Edward Phelps also believed in the primacy of principles
which are an integral part of Anglo-American history." According to
Phelps, lawyers should concern themselves not with cases but with "the
foundation principles which underlie all propositions of law." 1" These
principles form part of what Phelps called "The Law of the Land" which
is unalterable by the legislature.1 1 These principles are "inherent in the
human conscience," and "[tihey derive their authority from the spontaneous
and universal recognition of intelligent humanity, as well as from divine
revelation."" The rights which are based on these principles-rights to
life, liberty, and property-are therefore "placed beyond the reach of any
department of the government.""°c
Phelps found the primacy of these principles as the basis of law in
Anglo-American history."' In spite of the universal nature of these
principles and the rights resting on them, they are also in some way the
exclusive heritage of the Anglo-Saxon race, and are embodied in a unique
way in "the common law of England, which is likewise the common law
of the English-speaking race everywhere." 5 In addition, the common
law also includes certain "legal rights" which are the means of carrying out
the enjoyment of the fundamental rights."e These legal rights are the
growing part of the law which changes as society changes.' 7 They
custom, they cannot be changed or created overnight by legislative acts. Id at 269.
99. See E. PHELPS, Law of the Land, in ORATIONS & ESSAYS, supra note 49, at 119.
100. E. PHELPS, Law as a Profession, in ORATIONS & ESSAYS, supra note 49, at 71,
82.
101. E. PHELPS, Law of the Land, in ORATIONS & ESSAYS, supranote 49, at 119, 120.
For example, the Law of the Land would be "[t]he fundamental personal and political rights
which may not be infringed are enumerated and set forth, and are placed beyond the reach
of any department of the government." Id.
102. E. PHELPS, The Relation of Law to Justice, in ORATIONS & ESSAYS, supra note
49, at 91, 95. Phelps believed in fundamental principles of justice, or "moral justice," which
legal justice should attempt to approximate. Id. at 95.
103. E. PHELPS, The Law of the Land, in ORATIONS & ESSAYS, supra note 49, 119,
120-21. By referencing the incorporation of inviolable "natural rights" into the American
Constitution, Phelps defined a class of fundamental principles which may not be infringed
upon. Id. at 120-23.
104. Id at 121-22. Natural rights are antecedent to government. The Magna Carta and
the American Constitution protect the inviolability of these rights, separate from the
development of the common law. Id.
105. Id. at 122.
106. Id at 124. "The fundamental law divides, therefore, into two branches-the
principles that define human rights, and the machinery established for their security." Id
at 123.
107. Id.
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cannot be created by any authority, 108 and they are valid and enforceable
only to the extent that they reflect the condition of society.' 9
Belief in the organic nature of law led to and was nourished by a
belief in historical jurisprudence. Except for John Dillon's faint praise of
John Austin,11 o all these thinkers excoriated positivism, and exalted what
they understood to be Sir Henry Maine's contribution to jurisprudence.1
They were taking part in a vigorous debate over the nature of law and
legal science which dominated late nineteenth century American
jurisprudence. The background of that debate is a necessary predicate to
further discussion of the legal culture exemplified by the early antitrust
cases.
II.
This appeal to unchanging principles and the consequent inability of
the state to change them rests on a particular view of history. The use of
history to illuminate and defend the common law was not a new idea.
Glorification of the common law as the embodiment of English liberty was
a staple of that Whig history that justified opposition to Stuart tyranny.1
In 1861, however, the relationship of law and history entered a new era.
In that year, Henry Sumner Maine published Ancient Law."' Maine
traced the origin of legal rules into the past, especially the Roman past, and
tried to explain the mechanisms by which the law had changed in response
to changes in society.'14 Maine's explanation of the worth of his
enterprise clearly emphasized its scientific character:
If by any means we can determine the early forms of jural
conceptions, they will be invaluable to us. These rudimentary
ideas are to the jurist what the primary crusts of the earth are to
108. Phelps notes that worthwhile law comes by growth, not by arbitrary creation. Id.

at 124.
109. See id.
110. See J. DILLON, supra note 50, at 382.
111; See infra notes 124-40 and accompanying text.
112. See J. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY
OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY passim (1987); G.

POSTEmA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3-80 (1986). ,
113. H. MANE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WrrH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCiETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (F. Pollock rev. ed. 1906) (1st ed. 1861).
114. See id.
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the geologist They contain, potentially,
all the forms in which law
115
has subsequently exhibited itself.
Maine believed that ignorance of these early forms of law and rules was
responsible for the "unsatisfactory condition in which we find the science
of jurisprudence." 6 By ignoring the facts of legal history, jurists place
assumption over observation. The result is that
[t]heories, plausible and comprehensive, but absolutely unverified
...enjoy a universal preference over sober research into the
primitive history of society and law; and they obscure the truth
not only by diverting attention from the only quarter in which it
can be found, but by that most real and most important influence
which, when once entertained and believed in, they are enabled to
exercise on the later stages of jurisprudence." 7
Maine hoped to break the hold of such a priori concepts on legal
thought and to replace them with a scientific understanding of the growth
of law. Maine's chapter on the early history of property is a model of his
method.118 He criticized the belief, given classic form by Blackstone, that
occupancy is the foundation of private property. 9 According to
Blackstone, Maine stated, "[t]he earth and all things therein were the
general property of mankind from the immediate gift of the Creator." °
The gradual development of permanent ownership thus appeared to be the
natural progress towards modernity. Maine, however, denigrated this sort
of reasoning:
These sketches of the plight of human beings in the first ages of
the world are effected by first supposing mankind to be divested
of a great part of the circumstances by which they are now
surrounded, and by then assuming that, in the condition thus
imagined, they would preserve the same sentiments and prejudices
by which they are now actuated,-although, in fact, these
sentiments may have been created and engendered by those very
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.at 2-3.
Id.at 3.
Id.
See id. at 237-94.

119. Id. at 245-46.
120. Id. at 244.
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circumstances
of which, by the hypothesis, they are to be
21
stripped.1
In Maine's view, occupancy or "mere possession" attained as a means of
gaining ownershipcan arise only after the institution of property has been
well established.' Only after society accepts "a presumption, arising out
of the long continuance of that institution, that everything ought to have an
owner" can the person who asserts ownership acquire permanent,
inviolable rights." In short, talk of the almost mystical primacy of
private property is misplaced.
This philosophic aspect of Ancient Law was overshadowed, however,
by what was assumed to be the historical message of the work. It seemed
that only one phrase in the entire book was important: "[W]e may say that
the movement of the progressive societies has hither to been a movement
from status to contract." 24 Although, as Frederick Pollock noted,
[i]t is not clear how far Maine regarded the movement of which
he spoke as a phase of the larger political individualism which
prevailed in the eighteenth century and great part of the
nineteenth, or what he would have thought of the reaction against
this doctrine which we are now [in 1906] witnessing."
The contrast between analytical and historical jurisprudence antedates
the appearance of Maine's work. As early as 1840, James Reddie, a
Scottish lawyer, had identified two distinct schools of jurisprudence-the
analytical and the historical-associating the former with Jeremy Bentham
and the latter with Gustav Hugo and F.C. von Savigny. 26 In 1861, the
year of the publication of Ancient Law, James Fitzjames Stephen reviewed
together Maine's work and Austin's recently republished The Province of
Jurisprudence Determined. He identified the works as representing the
historical and the analytical schools respectively, and observed that both
were indispensable to a thorough understanding of law.'27 Similar views
could be found in the United States. In 1890, John Dillon told the Ohio
State Bar Association that there was truth in both the analytical and
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
50 (1840
127.

Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 249.
Id.
,
Id at 165.
Id. at 424.
See J. REDDIE, INQUIRIES ELEMENTARY AND HISTORICAL IN THE SCIENCE OF LAW
& photo. reprint 1982).
See W. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN 148-51 (1982).
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historical schools of jurisprudence, "that properly understood the two
schools are not antagonistic but complementary, and that the true course
is to combine the logical or analytical with the historical and experimental,
the former mainly supplying data for scientific arrangement, the latter
mainly supplying
12 the matter for a revised, improved, and systematic
jurisprudence."
The more common view, however, at least in the United States, saw
Ancient Law as an exemplary use of history to correct Austin's errors. For
example, William G. Hammond lamented that during his sojourn in
Germany, Austin fell completely "under the influence of the so-called
philosophical school of jurists" 2 9 and, therefore, had ignored the
historical school whose leader was F.C. von Savigny. Had the situation
been reversed, "the study of scientific jurisprudence in England might have
reached, a generation earlier, the point to which it has30 later been brought,
under the guidance of jurists like Sir Henry Maine."1
What Maine himself thought of Austin's work is not entirely clear. In
his recent study of Austin, however, W.L. Morison suggests that "the
substance of [Maine's] view [of Austin] has to be boiled down from two
long, and at times rambling, lectures" entitled Sovereignty and Sovereignty
and Empire, both published in 1875.'13 Near contemporaries came to
different conclusions. Dillon, for example, did not accept the definition of
law as command and considered the two lectures as having demolished
Austin's theory of command and sovereignty. 32 Carter, on the other
hand, in his intensely anti-Austinian Law: Its Origin, Growth and
Function,inveighed against what he judged Maine's approval of Austin's
theory of sovereignty evident in the same lectures.' 33 Frederick Pollock
found in Ancient Law "a hint that the analysis of positive law laid down
by Bentham and Austin (following Hobbes, though Bentham seems not to
have been aware of it) cannot be made to fit archaic society."" a4 Pollock
went on to note that Maine worked out his position in the lectures on
128. J. DILLON, supra note 50, at 339.
129. Hammond, John Austin and His Wife, 1 GREEN BAG 47, 49 (1889).

130. Id. Modern scholarship indicates that Austin was not ignorant of the historical
school of jurisprudence during his stay at the University of Bonn in late 1827 and early
1828, and that he in fact studied with aprivatim docens who was himself a disciple of the
historical school. See W. MORISON, supra note 127, at 17-20.
131. W. MORISON, supra note 127, at 152. For the Sovereignty and Sovereignty and
Empire lectures, see H. MAINE, LECTUREs ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 342400 (1875 & photo. reprint 1966).

132. See L DILLON, supra note 50, at 13 n.1.
133. See J. CARTER, supra note 48, at 187-90.
134. H. MAINE, supra note 113, at 389.
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sovereignty which he called "the foundation of sound modem criticism on
the Hobbist doctrine." 35
While Maine's two lectures are long and ramble over a broad
landscape, one plausible reading of them is that Maine was at most
ambivalent about the work of his two great predecessors, Bentham and
Austin. His attitude partakes a little of the sentiment that the enemy of my
enemy is my friend. For example, Maine stated that "the Analytical Jurists
failed to see a great deal which can only be explained by the help of
history, they saw a great deal which even in our day is imperfectly seen
136
by those who, so to speak, let themselves drift with history."
Moreover, Maine said that "Sovereignty and Law, regarded as facts," were
not always in the shape that corresponded to the ideas of them held by
Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin, but by the time these thinkers wrote "the
correspondence really did exist... and was tending constantly to become
more perfect."' 37 Thus, what they wrote was more true than not and was
becoming more true as time went on. Their writings were never so far
removed from fact as to be of no value, and indeed their value was great:
"No conception of law and society has ever removed such a mass of
undoubted delusion." M To these men "the world is indebted for the
only existing attempt to construct a system of jurisprudence by strict
scientific process and to found it, not on a priori assumption, but on the
observation, comparison, and analysis of the various legal
conceptions."' 39 In short, the analytical jurists and Maine were engaged
in the same endeavor to strip from law those plausible and comprehensive
but false theories that dominated the study of jurisprudence.
Whatever Maine thought on the subject, the American theorists often
invoke his name and appeal to history to show that law is not a command
or the product of will, but rather the expression of something greater than
individuals which is related to the collective experience of human life. In
turn, this experience, especially in Carter's version of history, is to a great
degree uniform and progressive, a development to an ordained end. As a
speaker before the American Bar Association put it in 1891, with specific
reference to Maine's work, "[ifn a modem industrial state, this freedom of
135. Id Pollock believed that Maine "dealt rather tenderly with Bentham and Austin"
out of reverence for their memories and from his own habit not "to exhibit the full
consequences of his ideas." Id. Pollock added that "[tihose who come after [Maine] are free
to push the conclusion home." Id at 390. For a modem treatment of the relationship
between the works of Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin, see G. POSTEMA, supra note 112, at
46-60, 314-17, 325-28.
136. H. MAINE, supra note 113, at 396-97.
137. Id. at 397.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 343.
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individual contract, representing a long and toilsome progressive social

development,
becomes essential in any rational conception of individual
40

liberty."
The appeal to history, therefore, was the proof of the existence of
inescapable law. The course of history involved the liberation of the
individual from the trammels of status, which the American thinkers
equated with the power of the state. The American past provided support
for such a belief. The Jacksonian tradition of privilege for none identified
state action with invidious discrimination and the appropriation of public
funds for private purposes, with class legislation, and special
legislation.14' The direct appeal to history, however, was something new,
or at least thought to be something new. The contest between analytical
and historical jurisprudence placed the entire enterprise on a new scientific
basis. Positivism placed the ultimate source of law in power and therefore,
at least by implication, in the hands of a political majority. That majority
could then change the very bases of the law, especially the protection
given private property, making real the threat of socialism and even
communism that special and class legislation represented. 42 The
majoritarian and therefore ultimately socialistic implications of positivism
were disproved by Maine's historical approach. Such a view was almost
a caricature of its alleged sources, but it was powerful nonetheless.
The role this variety of American legal thought played in the triumph
of laissez-faire in American constitutional law during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century has often been described. 43 The popularity of such
attitudes is usually explained by reference to the social and economic
circumstances of the time. Economic dislocation and labor unrest were a
constant theme of American life throughout this period. A series of strikes
in major industries, often involving attempts to win recognition of the right
to unionization, along with increasing immigration which seemed to bring
advocates of radicalism to America, helped to fuel fears like those
expressed by Dillon, Carter, and Phelps, the last of whom declared in 1886
140. Judson, Liberty of Contract Under the Police Power, 14 A.B.A. REP. 231, 233

(1891).
141. See Benedict, Laissez Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,3

LAW & HIST.

REV. 293, 305-26 (1985).

142. Id. at 309-11, 330-31.
143.

See, e.g., C. HAINES,

THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS: A STUDY OF

THE ESTABIUSHMENT AND OF THE INTERPRETATION OF LIMITS ON LEGISLATURES WITH

SPECIAL REFERENcE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN PHASES OF AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122-65 (1930); C. JAcOBS,

supranote 64, passim (1954); B. Twiss,

LAWYERs AND THE CoNsTrrunON: How LAIssEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREmE COURT

passim (1942).

1990]

LEGAL CULTURE

that advocacy of anarchy is "only appropriately met by the bullet and the
rope." 1 " Legal ideas thus become the servants of economic interests.
This brief examination of some of the expressions of these ideas in the
context of the formative period of Sherman Act jurisprudence, however,
shows in addition to overt appeals to fear of economic change an elaborate
intellectual basis to a new theory of law. In part because Austin's ideas
were assumed to provide a theoretical basis for unlimited legislative power,
the advocates of the preservation of property rights seized on the historical
jurisprudence which they believed was first voiced by Maine to create an
explanation of the nature of law which emphasized continuity and stability,
and gave a new justification to the old idea that judges merely declare the
law rather than make it.
The ability to appeal to history to support the unchanging principles
of law was especially useful in the creation of an acceptable legal science
because it appeared to link evolution to the science of the law. Carter
blamed the seductive appeal of Bentham's foolishness on the ignorance of
the pre-Darwinian world: "The law of Evolution so dominating in its
influence upon recent thought, had not been stated."145 Once it is
understood that society evolved, it becomes clear that legal rules are the
product of causes which reach far back into time and cannot be changed
by arbitrary legislation."4 One harried supporter of analytical
jurisprudence humorously described his dilemma in a world dominated by
ideas of slow change: "But quite certainly, in spite of all that can be urged,
the cultivators of analytical jurisprudence will still be reproached with
wanting historical mindedness, a graver charge in these days when
evolution is in the vey air,--it has been humorously said,-than heresy or
even petty larceny."1 4'

ml.
Not every judge who dealt with litigation under the Sherman Act
followed the path supposedly marked out by Maine's insights. Indeed,
some of these jurists drew on different views of the nature of law to
inform their consideration of antitrust problems.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was appointed to the United States
Supreme Court in 1902."* Two years later the Court decided Northern
144. E. PHELPS, Law of the Land, in ORATIONS & ESSAYS, supra note 49, at 119, 128.
145. J. CARTER, supra note 48, at 268.

146. Id. at 268-69.
147. Platt, The Characterand Scope ofAnalytical Jurisprudence,24 AM. L. REV. 603,
613 (1890).
148. G. AIcHELE, OuvER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.: SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, JuDaE 170
(1989).
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Securities Co. v. United States,149 which upheld a decree in equity
dissolving the holding company formed to control the Great Northern and
Northern Pacific Railways. '0 Justices Holmes and White filed dissenting
opinions in this case, each joining the other's. '' Chief Justice Fuller and,
surprisingly, Justice Peckham joined in both dissents as well.'52 William
53
Letwin has described Holmes's opinion as "great despite its flaws,"
bringing the paradox within the policy of the antitrust law sharply into
focus. Its greatness, according to Letwin, was exemplified by the
fearlessness of confronting the contradictory impulses embodied in the Act,
while its flaws included the Justice's fast and loose treatment of the
common-law precedents."5 The point to be made here, however, is a
broader one. The opinion reveals much about Holmes's beliefs about the
nature of law and judging.
Holmes disclaimed any need "to fortify [his] conclusion by any
generalities" about personal freedom, especially the freedom to own
property. 5 Rather, he maintained that his opinion rested solely on the
words of the statute whose "meaning
seem[ed] to [him] plain on their
face."" s Indeed, he admitted that sometimes
judges need for their work the training of economists or
statesmen, and must act in view of their foresight of
consequences, yet when their task is to interpret and apply the
words of a statute their function is merely academic to begin
with-to read English intelligently-and a consideration of
consequences comes into play, if at all, only when the meaning of
the words used is open to reasonable doubt. 57
According to Holmes, the meaning of the words used in the Sherman
Act could be gleaned from two, and only two, classes of cases: those
dealing with and defining "contracts in restraint of trade," and those
149. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).

150. Id.at 355-56, 360.
151. Id at 364 (White, J., dissenting), 400 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
152. Id
153. W. LETWw, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE

SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 234 (1954).
154. Id. According to Letwin, Congress wanted to both "preserve the benefits of
competition" and enjoy "the benefits of consolidation," and left the paradox of maintaining
theses dual goals to the courts. Id.
155. Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 403.
156. Id
157. Id at 401.

1990]

LEGAL CULTURE

involving "combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade." 58 While
the former generally involved disputes between private parties to a contract
restraining one party's business, the latter tended to create monopolies and
were regarded as contrary to public policy."" Contracts in restraint of
trade are contracts with strangers to the contractor's business which restrict
the contractor's freedom to carry on the business, while combinations or
conspiracies are directed at keeping strangers to the agreement out of the
business."6 Neither of these concepts has anything to do with abolishing
So long as "external restriction"
competition "by any form of union."'
is avoided, the agreement does not run afoul of the law." To hold
otherwise, Holmes said, would be to sweep almost every sort of business
arrangement into the ambit of the Act and that would mean "the universal
disintegration of society into single men, each at war with all the rest."
Holmes believed that Congress could not have intended such a result."6
If it had, the Act would not be a regulation of commerce but "an attempt
to reconstruct society."' 65 Whatever the wisdom of such an attempt,
Holmes pointed out that Congress did not have the power to effect this sort
of change, nor had it tried to."
Holmes had no sympathy for the policies embodied in the Sherman
Act."6 His understanding seems to have stopped with unbounded
admiration for Malthus and the consequent conclusion that socialism was
humbug."' He is often labelled a social Darwinist, someone who
believed that the struggle of life had to go on no matter what government
tried to do to stop it."' 9 As his opinion in Northern Securities makes
clear, however, Holmes did not believe that organization had no place in
158. Id. at 403-04.
159. Id
160. Id

161. Id at 406.
162. Id at 405. Holmes went on to say that "the provision has not been decided, and,
it seems to me, could not be decided without perversion of plain language, to apply to an
arrangement by which competition is ended through community of interest-an arrangement
which leaves the parties without external restriction." Id. at 405-06.
163. Id at 407.

164. Id
165. Id at 411.
166. Id
167. See G. AicHMLE supra note 148, at 140.
168. Id. (referring to Holmes as "a confirmed social Darwinist" who thought all
socialist writers since Marx "talked drool").
169. Id.; see also W. LErWIN, supra note 153, at 234 ("in private Holmes was a fairly
stock Social Darwinist").
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the struggle. In 1896, in his dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner,7 ° Holmes
argued that, absent any threats of physical injury, workmen should be
allowed to peacefully picket their employer in their quest for a shorter
work day and higher wages."' In the modem world, Holmes said, "free
To Holmes, this included
competition means combination." 72
combinations of labor, as well as capital.173 Two years earlier he had
written that attempts to end "combinations" might involve courts in "flying
in the face of the organization of the world which is taking place so fast,
and of its inevitable consequences." 7 4
It may be surprising to see Holmes so emphatically reading his views
of policy into the law, when he was perhaps most famous for refusing to
go along with the extremes of substantive due process in the name of
allowing the legislature the freedom to govern. 5 Holmes claimed,
6
interpreting
a statute which was couched in the
however, to be merelylaw.'
common
the
of
terms
If, as Holmes claimed, the ruling consideration behind the development
of law is "[tihe felt necessities of the time,"" then good judicial
decision making requires recognition of those necessities. Of course, such
a formulation begs the question of how a wise judge recognizes a
"necessity." Holmes recognized that a fear of great combinations
"somehow breathes from the pores of the [Sherman A]ct." 17 8 This "felt
necessity," however, could be ignored, because "it seem[ed] to be
contradicted in every way by the words in detail," as interpreted through
the common law. 179 To Holmes, the true necessity was the need to
170. 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
171. See id at 108-09, 44 N.E. at 1081-82.
172. Id at 108, 44 N.E. at 1081.
173. Id
174. Holmes, Privilege,Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1, 89 (1894).
175. See generally G. AICHEL supra note 148, at 133 (describing a tension in
Holmes's jurisprudence, between his insistence that judges accept the legislative nature of
their task and assume greater responsibility for directing policy, and his frequent calls for
deference to the will of democratically elected legislatures).
176. Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 401; see also G. AICHELE, supra note 148, at
123. According to Aichele, Holmes indicated this in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), where he said that "law is a statement of the circumstances in
which the public force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts." Id. at 356.
177. O.W. HoLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
178. Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 407.

179. Id.
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organize to survive in the modem world, and the common law must
develop to allow such survival."r°
Holmes's dismissal of the fear of bigness as an interpretive guide to
the Sherman Acte"1 came close to announcing that Congress enacted a
fraud upon the public by passing the statute. According to Holmes,
although Congress purported to attack the trusts, it had in fact merely
legislated the common law, which had nothing to do with equating the size
of commercial activity with evil."s Holmes was perhaps cynical enough
to intend such a reading of his words. In any event, he seized the
opportunity to do the judge's job"8 3 and further the development of law.
The use of the word "development," of course, implicates a
consideration of history," and Holmes's view of history was quite
different from that of the anti-positivists." The adherents of the
transcendent or realist view of law saw history as teleological; recording
the progress to a better way of life. i" 6 Government, society, and law must
conform to the unfolding plan and human choice must be bounded by its
parameters. A proper understanding of history will actually generate legal
doctrines such as freedom of contract. As a consequence, these doctrines
180. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 177, at 1.

181. See Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 407-08.
182. See id. at 405.
183. G. AicHELE, supra note 148, at 124. According to Aichele, Holmes stressed in
The Common Law that the judge's job was "to impose an external standard ofjudgment that
will result in the most desirable social consequences." Id.
184. See O.W. HOLMEs, supra note 177, at 1. Holmes wrote that "[t]he law embodies
the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as
if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." Id.
185. In fact, Harvard Law Professor Mark Howe considers Holmes the American father
of legal positivism. See Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REv.
529, 531 (1951). Legal positivism, as described by Howe, embodies the distinction between
what the law is versus what the law ought to be. Id. (citing L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEsT
Op ITSELF 5 (1940)). According to Howe, the philosophy of natural law is the stark contrast
to the positivist approach to law because it denies the rigid distinction between the is and
the ought. Id.
186. See B. PURCELt, THE CRIsIs OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 75-94 (1973). Legal
realists think of law as a practical problem where judges decide issues according to what
is socially desirable. Id at 76. Realists believe judges are influenced by personal and class
beliefs which are relative to their particular environments, and should be guided by
sociological evidence. Id at 76-77. Thus, realists focus on the legal process as it functions
in practice. Id at 77; see also Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their
Respective Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GRO. L.. 493
(1942) (discussing the development of legal realism and natural law and their respective
influences on democratic societies and the law).
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can and must be used to decide cases, whether they deal with the most
narrow questions of private law or with great issues of public policy.
Holmes draws nothing from history except the illustration of the felt
necessities of the time.' Changing times mean changing law. While the
legislature can change the law as it likes-at least so long as it stops short
of reconstructing society-the conscientious and perceptive common-law
18 In doing
judge must change the law so that it agrees with the times."
so, the judge is not merely promulgating historically dictated doctrine.
Holmes derided that view as believing the common law to be a "brooding
ommpresence
in the sky" which is brought down to earth by the
190
courts.
Justice Peckham exemplifies yet a third view of history, one which is
almost static. Rather than drawing on the newer idea of historical
jurisprudence which Maine was supposed to have created, 9' Justice
Peckham saw America as fulfilling a millennial dream, as a sort of
Protestant utopia, challenged by baleful economic change. An emphasis on
the religious mission of the nation was an important feature of pre-Civil
War republicanism when at least some Americans, as Dorothy Ross has
written, "assumed for the country a position somewhere between the
agrarian and commercial stages of development; they concluded that
America's huge reservoir of land would preserve its agrarian character and,
together with republican institutions, insure its progress virtually in
perpetuity."" -Justice Peckham thus exemplifies an older view of the
proper role of law in society.
There was yet another vision of legal science current at the time of the
first important decisions interpreting the Sherman Act. It is exemplified by
the work of yet another judge who would later become Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, William Howard Taft' 93
187. See Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40, 41 (1918).
188. Id.

189. Id. at 40.
190. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
191. See H. MANE, supra note 113, at 45. Maine states, in the first edition's preface,

that "[t]he chief objective of the following pages is to indicate some of the earliest ideas of
mankind, as they are reflected in Ancient Law, and to point out the relation of those ideas
to modem thought." Id.
192. Ross, Historical Consciousness in Nineteenth-Century America, 89 AM. HIST.
REV. 909, 912 (1984).

193. Taft is the only person who has served as both President of the United States and
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He was elected President in 1908 and lost his bid for
reelection in 1912. After leaving the presidency, Taft taught constitutional law at Yale Law
School and served as president of the American Bar Association for a year. President
Harding named Taft Chief Justice in 1921. See R. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M.
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IV.
For all his reliance on the common law in Northern Securities,Holmes
cited but a single case defining contracts in restraint of trade.1"4 The task
of thoroughly restating the common law on this topic fell some years
earlier to Taft, sitting on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. His opinion
in Addyston Pipe1 contains an elaborate discussion of an overwhelming
number of precedents.1" Taft's conclusion was to draw a distinction
between direct and ancillary restraints on trade, the former forbidden and
the later allowed."9 The opinion is flavored with a quest for objectivity
through the analysis of precedent. To do otherwise, it seems, would make
the validity of contracts depend upon "the vague and varying opinion of
judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men ought to
be allowed to restrain competition." 98 Several times Taft indicated that
a strict adherence to precedent reveals that courts should not impose their
views of political economy on litigants.1"
Taft's discussion of the numerous cases he cited looks much like the
case-briefing exercise of a beginning law student in a case-method law
school.' In fact, Amasa Eaton's 1890 article in the Harvard Law
Review, setting forth the common law on contracts in restraint of trade,
reads like a shortened version of the Taft opinion. 2 1 Each case is
discussed in a paragraph which is even more brief-like than Taft's
discussions. It appears that both the judge and the lawyer sought to find
answers not in great principles, but in the actual application of the common
law to individual cases.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at xix (1986); Mason, William Howard Taft, in THE
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OPINIONs 2103 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
194. See Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 403-04 (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.
Wins. 181 (1711)).
195. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
196. Taft cited and discussed over twenty-five federal, state, Canadian, and British
cases. See id at 283-92.
197. Id. at 283. Professor Hovenkamp finds Taft's opinion to be "disingenuous" and
maintains that the judge played somewhat fast and loose with the very cases he purported
to so carefully analyze, an observation which does not, however, diminish the significance
of the technique used. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 286-87.
198. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 283.
199. See id. at 283, 285-86.
200. Taft's analysis of the cases consists of a listing of the material facts, the legal
issue or issues presented, and the holding. See id, at 284-92.
201. See Eaton, On Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV. L. REV. 128, 136-37
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Taft was sympathetic to the new methods of teaching law that began
with Christopher C. Langdell's deanship at Harvard Law School.2" The
legal theory behind those new methods found the law not in overarching
general principles, but in cases.' Langdell went so far as to banish
jurisprudence from Harvard and to restrict law professors to teaching "the
law," which was narrowly defined as the holdings of the appellate
courts. 4 Taft's opinion in Addyston Pipe illustrates one result of the
application of this view to judging. The precedents present the law in such
a way as to limit, and even exclude from the judicial process, judges' ideas
about policy.W
A more radical result is illustrated by Langdell's comments2 °
concerning the circuit court opinion in Northern Securities,which was later
affirmed by the Supreme Court. °7 The bulk of the article is devoted 2to
08
arguing that the court's decree was not authorized by the statute.
Without positive legislative authority, the decree could only be sanctioned
by the traditional doctrines of equity.2° Equitable doctrines were to be
derived from an examination of precedent, much as the meaning of
restraint of trade must be. Langdell found no precedents; thus, in his view,
the decree was illegal. °
The remarkable part of Langdell's article, however, is the assertion
that there was no need to apply the Sherman Act to railroads in order to
prevent the evil the statute had been designed to prevent.211 Railways
damage the public only by charging unreasonable rates, and "for such an
202. R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980s, at 61 (1983). When Taft reorganized the University of Cincinnati Law School
in 1895, he implemented the case method. Id.at 61, 70.

203. Id. at 52-53. The case method was based on the assumption that legal principles
were best derived from appellate court opinions, whose applicability was not bounded by
state lines. This process helped to remedy judicial deviation from established principles. Id.
204. Id Under Langdell's influence, the case law method consisted of analyzing
appellate decisions in terms of doctrinal logic. Id
205. Appropriately enough, Theodore Dwight, whose"Dwight Method" of teaching law

through reading treatises and classroom recitations was considered to be the principal
alternative to Langdell's case method, produced an analysis of the legality of trusts which
mixed analysis of cases with appeals to the principles of liberty of contract and commercial
freedom. See Dwight, The Legality of 'Trusts", 3 PoL. Sci. Q. 592, 610-11, 628-30 (1888).

206. See Langdell, The Northern Securities Case and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 16
HARV. L REV. 539 (1903).

207. 120 F. 721 (C.C.D. Minn. 1903), aff'd, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
208. See Langdell, supra note 206, at 542-54.

209. Id at 543.
210. Id at 547-53.
211. See id at 543-45, 553.
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injury the state already had an incomparably better remedy than any which
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act can furnish, in its unquestioned power to
regulate and ontrol railway rates." 212 Additionally, competition was
ruinous to railways, as well as the public, and would not result in "keeping
prices within reasonable limits. " 213 According to Langdell, the only
competition possible among railways is at "competing points" where lower
rates are given to those who ship goods at those points at the expense of
those who can only ship at noncompeting points.1 4
The answer for Langdell was either governmental regulation or
outright governmental ownership.215 He observed that "if the state were
to undertake the duty of rendering to the public, the services which are
rendered by railway companies, every one would agree that its monopoly
of such service should be complete and absolute." 216 Furthermore,
"when the state delegates to railway companies the right to render these
services, and imposes upon them the corresponding duties," the state must
protect the railways against competition as if the state itself operated the
railways." 7 It must plan comprehensively and permit new construction
only with its permission and only where new roads are needed. 1 8 In fact,
the "ideal railway system" would be a single system consisting of all of the
roads in a state, controlled "either by the direct authority of the state, or by
the direct authority of those by whom the system is owned, acting,
however, under such rules and regulations as the state from time to time
sees fit to make."2 19
Langdell's focus on law as nothing more than what is in the cases
allowed him to exclude from consideration those great principles of
ultimate right which so permeate the other perspectives examined in this
article.2 Langdell's consideration of the railway problem resulted in
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
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Id. at 553-54.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id.
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218. Id,
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220. Langdell's legal analysis of the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act
involved the narrowly legal discussion of the common law of restraint of trade and an
attempt to understand the language regarding monopolies in section 2 by applying its terms
to the forming of a small partnership engaged in a small-scale business enterprise. See
Langdell, The Northern Securities Case Under a New Aspect, 17 HARV. L. REV. 41 (1903).
The same analogy to partnership was used in J.C.G., The Merger Case, 17 HARV. L. REV.
474 (1904). Professor Hovenkamp quite sensibly assumes that the author was Langdell's
colleague on the Harvard faculty, John Chipman Gray. H. HoVENKAMP, supra note 3, at
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severing the narrow legal questions from larger questions of public policy
and approaching the latter from a point of view which does not hobble the
powers of the state."2 For Langdell, history was relevant only in the
form of decided cases, which were discussed without any reference to their
historical context.
This "pure law" approach captured, for the case-method law school,
its own science of law, separate from every other discipline.2 But it
also stripped from the legal enterprise consideration of larger issues of
public policy which other approaches to law considered in this article kept
in clear sight. Those questions were left for other professionals trained in
other disciplines. Justice Taft expressed this view in his opinion in
Addyston Pipe, when he implied that judgments based on principles of
political economy were better suited for economists than judges.9
Not long after Langdell's death, legal thinkers describing themselves
as realists would stridently, and somewhat unfairly, challenge Langdell's
idea of law, denouncing it as a sterile formalism and promoting what they
considered to be an interdisciplinary approach. 4 In a sense, the realists
strived, often vainly, to bring the greater good back into legal discourse.
The problem, of course, was to find a basis on which the public good
could be determined. At its most rigorous, Holmes's apparent submission
to the force of history was too passive-too accepting of what fate brought.
The search for the answers turned to the social sciences with scant results.
Decades later, however, a mature discipline of economics would be
sufficiently rigorous to beguile legal thinkers into creating the most
complete fusion of law and social science to date.2 5 The rise of law and
economics is the return of the greater good to the discussion of the nature
of law. The will of the market place-the invisible hand-simply has
416 n.71.
221. See Langdell, supra note 206, at 553.
222. R. STEVENS, supra note 202, at 51-54. Stevens notes that the science of law is
intended to emphasize its practicality; law provides a system of doctrines that seems to
provide consistent, mechanistic responses to legal questions. Id.
223. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 283 (referring to judges' opinions based on principles of
political economy as "vague and varying").
224. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
225. See generally, e.g., Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on
Ellickson, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 57 (1989). Judge Posner asserts that allowing legal
thinkers to inject "random bits of information about human nature and society," which are
acquired from the study of social sciences other than economics, into their law and
economic models will give these thinkers too much freedom. Id. at 61. He asserts that the
economic model should be as empirical (i.e., scientific) as possible. L Judge Posner
considers the economic model of law to be the "most fruitful in the history of the social

sciences." Id at 62.
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replaced the will of God, as revealed in history as the determining element,
the one authority which human law cannot contradict. It may be that in
some great overwhelming sense, no legal system can do without such
ultimate authority-unabashed positivism is not for the faint hearted. We
once again seem to be in an era in which the public interest is defined not
by the will of the public but by a transcendent will greater than all of us.

